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Abstract
Much of the recent interest in the relationship between growth and distribution has focused on
advanced economies and neglected issues of development and structural transformation. The
purpose of this paper is to make a contribution to this gap by arguing that, even in the short-run,
some of the conclusions from neo-Kaleckian models may not be robust to developing country
contexts with extreme income inequality and correspondingly polarized patterns of consumption.
This argument is supported by a review of, amongst other, Kalecki’s writing on development and
a two-sector model building on Razmi et al (2012). The paper can be interpreted as a call for
greater consideration of structural heterogeneity in extending the analysis of advanced economies
to developing economies and as a caution against calls for general aggregate demand policy, in
this case shifts in income distribution, to address structural transformation problems.
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1. Introduction
This paper addresses whether the theoretical conclusions from neo-Kaleckian models, specifically
regarding the proposal of ‘wage-led growth’ are robust to developing country contexts where the
pattern of consumption is extremely polarized across class or income groups. Advocates for wageled growth argue for the growth enhancing effects of greater equality of income between workers
and capitalists. These arguments have received great interest in macroeconomic debates in recent
years, mainly in the heterodoxy, but amidst sections of the mainstream too, in light of the
concerning explosion of income inequality and stagnant growth rates in many advanced
economies. However, amidst these recent debates, there has been little discussion regarding the
relevance of wage-led growth to the developing country context. Particularly, there seems a
relative gap in the literature regarding the implications of advocacy for the policy proposals most
closely associated with neo-Kaleckian models for structural change. Insofar as neo-Kaleckian
models, in their one-sector nature, disregard interrelations between economic sectors of distinct
significance to projects of economic development, there are limitations on these models as a basis
for assured policy recommendations in dual-economies. Hence, this paper has two principal
elements: 1) it speaks to a gap in the contemporary literature on distribution and growth and 2) it
seeks to assess the compatibility of an important heterodox discourse with a central objective of
all underdeveloped countries. Part of the aim of this paper, without wishing to resort to exegesis,
is to bring some of Kalecki’s criticism of the relevance of crude demand-side policy as a stimulus
to development to the fore.
The central argument of this paper is that contemporary Kaleckian arguments have less
explanatory power in contexts where domestic production is in important senses oriented away
from domestic wage-goods consumption1. A version of this argument was made outside of the of
the recent Kaleckian analytical tradition by De Janvry & Sadoulet (1983) and it is the purpose of
this paper to bring this argument to enhance the recent debate on Kaleckian models. The main
contribution of this paper is the repurposing of the model in Razmi et al (2012) to bring De Janvry
& Sadoulet’s (1983) argument to the contemporary discussion about distribution and growth. The
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The South African economy, considering its extreme polarization in income distribution and export-oriented
minerals sector, may be a relevant example of this.
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paper shows that neo-Kaleckian theory may not be robust to countries with extreme polarization
in the distribution of income. This conclusion is relevant to macro-policy debates in countries like
Brazil and South Africa – countries where a welcome desire to lessen income inequality may have
at times been mistaken as a tool for stimulating growth and development.
2. Kaleckian models, Kalecki and ‘Disarticulation’
2.1 The neo- and post-Kaleckian model
In setting out the basic form neo-Kaleckian model used for articulation of the ‘wage-led growth’
discourse, we will refer to Lavoie (2014) and Hein (2014). Lavoie outlines four core dimensions
of a Kaleckian model of distribution and growth: 1) an investment function, depending on the rate
of utilisation, amongst other; 2) mark-up pricing; 3) a discrepancy between the propensity to save
out of wages and the propensity to save out of profits, with the latter being greater than the former;
4) the rate of utilisation is assumed to be below full capacity and the absence of a labour constraint
(Lavoie, 2014: 360). Appendix 1 sets out the canonical neo- and ‘post-Kaleckian’ framework in
full.
2.2 Kalecki on development
In exploring the consistency of Kalecki’s own view on distribution and growth in developing
country contexts with the policy conclusions derived from one-sector models such as the neo and
post-Kaleckian, Ghosh (2011) provides useful insights. Ghosh points out that Kalecki, when
interrogating the differences between advanced and emerging capitalist economies, had
fundamentally different diagnoses of the principal cause of unemployment in these two contexts.
She suggests that Kalecki held the problem in developed countries to relate to issues of inadequate
effective demand, whereas in developing countries Kalecki understood as key, structural issues
related to capital shortage (Ghosh, 2011: 6). This view of Kalecki’s view on development is
corroborated by Sawyer who argues that a “first and basic theme expressed by Kalecki (e.g.
Kalecki, 1975, Chapter 1) is that the cause of unemployment in underdeveloped countries… is
seen to result from the shortage of capital equipment rather than from a deficiency of effective
demand” (Sawyer, 1985: 213) (Sachs, 2004: 166). Another way of depicting this would be to
characterize the principal problem in developing countries as not stemming from unutilised
capacities but rather insufficient capacities. Indeed, Lavoie (2014) notes that Kalecki made a
similar claim to Robinson that “unemployment in most developing countries is not due to a
2

deficiency of effective demand, but rather to a deficiency of equipment. Keynesian remedies can
be effective as a solution to a problem of under-utilisation of capacity, but it is evident that they
cannot create a capacity that doesn’t already exist” (Lavoie, 2014: 278 [quoted from Pizano, 2009:
96]).
For Ghosh, the problem of demand-side policies bringing about inflationary pressure
became fundamental to all of Kalecki’s work on development. This view was held simultaneously
(and by implication, compatibly) with an acceptance that there may be deficient effective demand
and underutilised capacities in a given underdeveloped economy. Support was given by the idea
that underdeveloped (and even semi-industrialised) economies were characterized by a high
income-elasticity of demand for wage goods like foods, yet the supply of these goods in these
countries is characterized by low elasticity (Lopez and Assous, 2010: 184). Hence, the problem of
potential inflationary pressure in the process of economic development is not articulated as a
‘monetary’ problem for Kalecki (Sachs, 2004: 171). Interestingly, for discussion of the model that
will be proposed later as an alternative schema, Lopez and Assous reference Kalecki’s work on
Israel in 1951, where he emphasized that although there may be considerable unused capacity in
parts of the industrial sector, strong constraints exist on the ability to stimulate domestic
consumption of goods from this advanced sector (Lopez and Assous, 2010: 184).
The essential macroeconomic issue in developing economies was, according to Kalecki,
thus expressed as how to achieve expanded productive capacity through increasing investment. In
characterizing some of the most significant aspects of Kalecki’s views on development, Sachs
(2004) emphasizes Kalecki’s view that “the rate of growth of labour productivity… is the
foundation for both economic and social progress and improvement in living standards, provided
the gains in productivity are equitably distributed within the society” and that “industrialization is
the principal leverage of structural transformation for an underdeveloped economy” (Sachs, 2004:
176). This is supported by Kalecki (1955), where it was noted that the growth of real wages will
be best supported by such a process insofar as it implies an increase in food prices to a lesser extent
than the decrease in price of industrial goods precipitated by the productivity growth-enhancing
accumulation of capital (assuming workers consume enough industrial goods that the end result
will be an increase in their real wages) (Kalecki, 1955: 9). Although, this contrasts slightly with
Lopez and Assous (2010) where Kalecki is quoted as supporting the notion that in the context of
3

small internal demand, industrialization has to be outwardly oriented, unless sufficiently high
investments stimulate demand for consumption goods (Lopez and Assous, 2010: 176-177).
To assess the terms under which Kalecki may have derived conclusions about the
applicability of aggregate demand policy to stimulate development, Kalecki (1955) is instructive.
Here he attempts to set out a two-sector model, producing investment and consumption goods
respectively. The first constraint Kalecki seems to derive stems from a failure for supply of
consumption goods to expand in a corresponding fashion to an increase in demand (through the
assumption of operation at full capacity in the consumption goods sector), bringing about ‘forced
savings’ as the price of these consumer goods increase, pushing up saved profits and pushing down
real wages (Kalecki, 1955: 4). Particularly, Kalecki makes note of the potential in developing
country contexts for the supply of food to suffer from a rigidity which may give rise to inflation
under stimulus of demand-side policies. The second scenario Kalecki considers entails, in contrast
to the previous scenario, the assumption of excess capacities such that increased demand for
consumption goods can be met and hence the output of the consumption goods sector grows in
response to increases in consumption demand (Kalecki, 1955: 5). These are quite basic schemas
for assessing the effect of demand side stimulus in a developing country context, but they suggest
an awareness that the structural features of developing countries have the prospect to alter the
relevance of demand side policies in these contexts.
This point can be elaborated upon by considering the different circumstances under which
a demand-side policy can bring about demand for goods other than industrial consumption goods.
In general, it seems that Kalecki derived an inverse relationship between investment and real wages
in the development process because of the aforementioned issue regarding inelastic supply of
wage-goods. In more concrete terms, a central aspect of Kalecki’s work on the relationship
between distributional considerations and investment decisions suggests “accumulation is funded
by reductions in the real wage” (Fitzgerald, 1990: 196). The inverse relationship between
development and more even income distribution is also partly explained by Kalecki’s view that
productivity gains in the industrial sector are likely to occur amidst a tendency towards increased
concentration in the process of economic development (Kalecki, 1955: 10).
Some of the analysis offered by Kalecki reflected upon in the paragraphs above is tied to
the assumption of inelastic supply in the consumption goods sector, which may not be relevant to
4

today’s semi-industrialized economies. However, Kalecki’s interest in the effect of the demand
side exogenous shock on demand for the industrial good and his use of a two-sector approach will
serve as motivation for some of the analysis below.
The account of Kalecki’s approach to development presented above leads us to two central
propositions. First that Kalecki made a distinction between his analysis of advanced countries and
underdeveloped countries and that at the very least his analysis was not insensitive to the effect of
economic structure on the applicability of demand-side policies. Second, there were dominant
themes in the way he expressed divergent conditions in advanced and developing countries. He
made special note of issues related to an insufficient stock of capital for the latter set of countries,
rather than unutilised capacity and deficient demand as behind underdevelopment. As such, it
appears that Kalecki may have, in contrast to neo-Kaleckians, placed strong qualifications on the
use of redistribution as a tool for economic development in underdeveloped countries. In support
for this thesis, Fitzgerald (1990) argues that Kalecki explicitly dissents from the
“underconsumptionist thesis that market size limits industrial growth in developing economies
[and that] increased investment will generate matching demand for consumer goods from the
wages fund” (Fitzgerald, 1990: 185).
In Kalecki’s own words, “’in the course of economic development, there will be a tendency
towards increased concentration in industry, a rise in the degree of monopoly… [where] the final
result will be a shift in distribution of income from wages and agricultural incomes to industrial
profits’” (Fitzgerald, 1990: 185 [quoted from: Kalecki, 1976: 50]). Without wishing to
unnecessarily or falsely evoke the ‘authority’ of Kalecki, this account of Kalecki’s view on
development seem to stand in opposition to the assumed generalized applicability contemporary
Kaleckians in their broad-brush advocacy for wage-led growth.
2.3 Two-sector models and ‘social disarticulation’
Some of these issues have received recognition in development theory after Kalecki. In this section
we will review existing literature which makes use of or comments on two-sector models, with an
eye to assess the role for wage-led growth and policies that principally aim to stimulate demand in
developing-country contexts. The purpose of this section is two-fold: firstly, to outline critical
takes on one-sector Kaleckian models and secondly to outline literature that feeds into the positive
contribution of the model in section 3.
5

Two-sector models have played an important role in the development of growth theory in
general, as Trigg (2006) has pointed out, but the dual-sector model has a special importance for
development theory in particular. Dutt (1996) illustrates this point somewhat, arguing that the onesector Keynesian “model abstracts from all supply constraints that were argued to be relevant for
LDCs, because it assumes that excess capacity always exists, that there is only one input (and no
skilled labour, working capital, and infrastructure), there is only one sector (thereby ruling out
agricultural constraints), and that we have assumed a closed economy, which makes foreign
exchange constraints irrelevant” (Dutt, 1996: 130).
Taylor and Arida (1988) similarly point out the significance of a multi-sectoral approach.
Within this commentary Taylor and Arida make an important observation relevant to Kaleckian
demand-stimulus arguments in the developing country context. They point out that “if
industrialization beyond production of simple goods like food and textiles is to occur… then
income concentration to sustain demand for more sophisticated commodities is unavoidable under
present social conditions” (Taylor and Arida, 1988: 167). This theme was important to Latin
American Structualism. A good example of this is De Janvry and Sadoulet’s aforementioned
(1983) paper. Their central innovation was to formalize the idea that when the consumption pattern
of the working class was profoundly distinct from the upper classes, and if production in what we
might refer to as ‘the key growth sector’ is geared overwhelmingly to demand from the upper
classes, growth of key sectors requires increasing inequality (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983: 278).
In characterizing this dynamic the authors coined the term ‘social disarticulation’. An illustrative
example, if in the extreme, is where the key sectors of the economy produce only luxury goods,
which are not consumed out of wage income by workers. In this case, a redistribution towards
wage earners does not support a Kaleckian ‘accelerator effect’. The analysis developed by De
Janvry and Sadoulet referred directly to Kalecki, but the analytical model they developed differs
significantly from what is referred to as ‘Kaleckian’ today, insofar as it, amongst other, lacked any
reference to functional income distribution (preferring the inclusion of some measure of wage
inequality) and the investment function lacks reference to utilisation and the profit-share in its
argument.
It is worth going into more detail on De Janvry and Sadoulet (1983), given its importance
to the central argument of this paper. They argue that “equitable growth can only occur if either
6

(1) the distribution of income is within a threshold of inequality that insures sufficient participation
of workers’ wage income to the final demand for the key growth sectors of the economy… or (2)
the choice of key growth sectors is such that an important part of their market is located in workers’
wage income” (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983: 278). These authors contrast their case of social
disarticulation, where labour is exclusively a cost to capital, with Kalecki (1968), where wages are
reported to make up the largest proportion of demand for all sectors within the economy, and
therefore, in full employment, “steady-state growth requires that any increase in the productivity
of labor in the sphere of production must be matched by an increase in real wages in the sphere of
circulation”, implying the dual nature of labour as both a cost and a necessity to capital’s interests
(De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983: 279). De Janvry and Sadoulet use a model built on two sectors (a
non-capitalist, traditional, wage-goods sector and a capitalist, modern sector, also producing
capital goods), where capital accumulation is confined to the latter sector (by definition, since the
traditional sector does not have capital). In the model there are three agents: workers, managers
and capital (the former two who save a proportion of their income, the latter who saves all of their
income). Investment is directed at the modern sector principally.
The dynamic analysis of the authors shows the possibility of three types of growth: 1)
Where the investment structure implies the modern sector is the ‘key growth sector’ and the
income structure suggests the economy is suited to a process of ‘unequalising industrialisation’
(typically observed in developing countries) (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983: 293). 2), Where social
articulation has occurred and the modern sector is the key sector, suggesting the economy is suited
toward a more egalitarian distribution of income (a situation observed in advanced countries,
where wages are high enough to support consumption of modern sector goods). The authors add
that less-developed countries might still fit in this category and that “the poorer the country, the
more egalitarian the ‘articulating’ threshold in the distribution of income is” (meaning, the poorer
the country, the higher the level of equality required for the economy to be articulated) (De Janvry
and Sadoulet, 1983: 294). In the third and final case, equalizing growth can be achieved through
making the traditional sector the key growth sector, but this requires investment to be shifted to
this sector to meet equilibrium conditions (De Janvry and Sadoulet, 1983: 295). As investment
rises in this sector, incomes rise and, provided Engel’s Law, which suggests that as incomes
increase the proportion of income dedicated to consumption of food declines, consumption shifts
from the traditional sector to the modern sector.
7

Harris (1996) develops similar analysis in rejecting a structurally invariant theoretical
approach to economic development, in his critique of the appropriateness of Keynesian theory as
a basis for development policy. Principally, this critique is founded on two views: 1) that the
economic structure of developing countries is characterized by disarticulation, 2) states in
developing countries lack the economic sovereignty required for the implementation of Keynesian
policy (Harris, 1996: 158). It is the former view which is of most direct relevance for this paper.
Harris puts forward this idea with reference to the idea that Keynesian models implicitly assume
an integrated and articulated economy. Harris contrasts these models with dual-economy
‘Kaleckian and Lewis-type models’, which show that “if import substitution is ruled out and the
modern sector’s principal markets are external, it is not responsive to domestic demand
management, and an expansionary shock to the modern sector does not generate multiplier type
demand and output increases in a positive feedback with the backward sector because of their
segmentation” (Harris, 1996: 160).
A common thread in the frameworks commented on above regards their emphasis on the
importance of heterogeneous economic structure in discussing distribution and growth dynamics.
In support of this, Ocampo (2014) is helpful in emphasizing the extent to which “rapid economic
growth in developing countries is the result of the reallocation of labor towards high-productivity
activities subject to increasing returns to scale” (Ocampo, 2014: 22, 9).2 Hence, Ocampo
distinguishes between ‘balloon’ views of economic growth (whereby increased factors of
production and flows of technological change evenly and steadily inflate aggregate GDP) to his
preferred view that per capita GDP growth is associated with frequent altering of the sectoral
composition of output (Ocampo, 2014: 7). This is also partly in line with De Janvry and Sadoulet’s
aforementioned attempt to problematize the extent to which there is a coincidence of interests
between more even income distribution and increased demand for the ‘key growth sectors’ of the
economy. The following section stressing an alternative model for assessing the effect of a
redistribution on economic development, is built around evaluating the effect of a redistribution
towards workers on two sectors, provided a ‘disarticulated’ pattern of consumption. The
complementarity between the forthcoming section and ideas outlined in this section can be found
in the relevance of the argument in De Janvry & Sadoulet (1983) to the model in section 3.1.

2

It should be mentioned that this type of perspective has a history particularly in the Kaldorian tradition.
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3. Model
3.1 A ‘disarticulated’ Kaleckian model
This section will outline an alternative model (to the neo and post-Kaleckian model) for assessing
the effect of a redistribution on growth in an underdeveloped economy. Using and slightly
modifying Razmi et al (2012)3, it will set out what could be described as a Kaleckian model of
disarticulation. It has the more specific goal of serving as a basis for assessing the effect of a
change in distribution on capital accumulation (given the importance of capital accumulation to
economic development).
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Output in the non-tradable sector
Labour coefficient
Employment in the non-tradable sector
Nominal non-tradable sector wage
Worker bargaining power
Non-tradable sector price level, in domestic currency
Tradable sector price level, in foreign currency
Mark-up
Output in the tradable sector
Nominal tradable sector wage
Real wage across both sectors, in terms of non-traded goods
Capacity utilisation
Capital coefficient
Capital stock
Real exchange rate
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Nominal exchange rate
Domestic demand for non-tradable goods
Share of capitalist and landlord consumption on non-tradable goods
Real exchange rate coefficient
Domestic demand for tradable goods
Accumulation rate
Animal spirits
Utilisation coefficient
Tradable sector profit share coefficient
Exports
International price of tradable goods
Price of capital goods, imported
Wage premium
Fiscal policy (subsidies, tariffs)

3

For brevity in this section, some expressions unchanged from the full model outlined in Razmi et al (2012) can be
found in an appendix at the end of this paper.
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Equation 1 gives the real wage in the non-tradable sector.
The tradable sector real wage is equal to the non-tradable sector real wage. This assumption is
made for simplicity.
)' =

78
98

= )"

(2)

The variable capturing worker bargaining power, v, is the primary exogenous variable in this
model while the other distributional variables can be understood as endogenous. Worker
bargaining power may be influenced by policy.
-" = %:#" + %:# ' + (1 − E)(.)[,*H+ − %:# ' + :#" − %:#" ]

(3)

Equation 3 gives demand for non-tradable goods. It is assumed that workers spend all of their
income on consumption of non-tradable goods. Meanwhile, capitalist and landlords save, and
consume both non-tradable and tradable goods. As such, demand for non-tradable goods is a
function of the total wage payment to workers in each respective sector (the first two terms) and a
function of profit income from capitalist and landlords multiplied by the consumption rate (1 − E)
and the share of capitalist consumption of non-tradable goods.
Equation 4 gives the proportion of capitalist and landlord expenditure on non-tradable goods,
depending positively on the real exchange rate (q).
. = ℎ, = ℎ(1 + ()%:

(4)

Equation 5 gives pricing in the tradable sector. Prices are marked up on the real wage. The
inclusion of mark-up pricing allows for two possible scenarios after the exogenous variable v is
increased in the model: ‘Case 1’, where the mark-up declines as a result of the increase of v, in
order to maintain q and . constant and ‘Case 2’, where the mark-up is constant, implying an
increase in q and .. The implications of these two scenarios will be explored on in the analysis at
the end of this section.
K&' = (1 + ()%:&"

(5)
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Demand for tradable goods excludes worker consumption demand, reflecting De Janvry &
Sadoulet’s ‘disarticulation’ argument. The complete exclusion of worker consumption for tradable
goods is a strong assumption, but one that allows for a simple inclusion of Engel’s Law.4
-' = (1 − E)(1 − .)[,*H+ − %:# ' + :#" − %:#" ]/,

(6)

In the short run, export demand is not assumed to be perfectly elastic, instead the level is
predetermined and the growth of exports can be understood to depend on the tradable good’s
international competitiveness:
Q9
MN = O P 9∗RS , f’ < 0

(7)

R

Meanwhile, the profit-share and utilisation rate both positively relate to the accumulation rate:
V
W
V
W

[

= O(X, *, Y ' ) = O ZX, *, P1 − ) \]R S^ ; O_ > 0, OaR > 0

(8)

= X + 0* + 1Y '

(9)

R

With additional equations and equilibrium condition (set out in full in the appendices), we can
solve the model for equilibrium values of utilisation, output and investment and do the following
comparative static exercises:
We can now look at the effect of an increase in v in ‘Case 1’ (where q and . are constant):
b]8∗
bc

_dW

ci

k(efl)\

_dW

i

= (efc)g h j + efk(efl)m + h(efc)m j > 0

(10)

Taking exports and the share of capitalist and landlord expenditure on non-tradable goods as fixed,
the derivative of tradable sector output with respect to v gives the following.
b]R∗
bc

4

=0

(11)

In principle, agricultural goods can be tradable but the working assumption here is that agricultural wage goods are

produced by small-scale producers incapable of entering international markets due to a lack of standardization and
quality control, for example.
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Below the accumulation rate is derived with respect to v. This result is core to the analysis that
will be derived from the model.
n
o

b( )∗
bc

=

fpi[R
\]R

<0

(12)

We can now look at the effect of an increase in v, taking ( as constant (‘Case 2’), by incorporating
definitions of . and q that includes their relationship to v (from equations 7, 8 and 9):
As can be seen immediately below, the effect of an increase in v on non-tradable output becomes
less clear when the mark-up is assumed to be constant. An intuitive explanation will be provided
in the analysis below.
q!"∗
q%
=

*H+
1
ℎ(1 + ()% r :r (1 − E)(1 + ()
s
+
t
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2ℎ(1 + ()r %:r (1 − E){[1 − ℎ(1 + ()%:](1 − E)} + ℎr (1 + ()z % r :z (1 − E)r
v[
]
(1 − %)
{[1 − ℎ(1 + ()%:](1 − E)]}r
(13)

The effect of an increase in v on output in the tradable sector, when the mark-up is constant, has a
negative sign, as can be seen below.
b]R∗
bc

=

f{|i(e}~)(efl)
l

<0

(14)

An increase in v also negatively effects the accumulation rate when the mark-up is constant.
n
o

b( )∗
bc

=−

{|i(e}~)(efl)
dWl

<0

(15)

Having set out the model above and key results, we can now evaluate the effect of an increase of
the bargaining power of workers (v) in the model. There are two broad scenarios under which this
can be done: ‘Case 1’, where an increase in v underlies a reduction in the mark-up (q and . remain
constant) and ‘Case 2’, where the mark-up is constant (q and . increase with K&' ). In the first case,
output in the non-tradable sector increases while output in the tradable sector remains unchanged.
While the rate of utilisation remains unchanged, the tradable sector is not completely unaffected
12

since the tradable sector profit share declines as a result of an increase in v. As a result, the rate of
accumulation is negatively affected by the increase in v. This result is mathematically confirmed
by equation 12.
In Case 2, when the mark-up is constant, the effect of an increase of v on non-tradable
output is not immediately clear. However, one would expect output to increase by a greater extent
than in Case 1 since the proportion of capitalist and landlord expenditure on non-tradable goods
(.) would increase, in addition to the wage bill (all of which goes to consumption of non-tradable
goods). In contrast, the consequences for tradable sector output are clearly negative, as equation
14 shows. The assumption of a constant mark-up implies an increase in v raises K&' , which
increases q and as a result .. In such a circumstance, utilisation is negatively affected by an
increase in ., as follows from Appendix 4, while the profit share in the tradable sector remains
unchanged. The combination of these factors stands to have a total effect that unambiguously
influence the accumulation rate negatively (equation 15).
It is important to note that, in contrast to simple one-sector neo-Kaleckian models, the
‘disarticulated’ model presented here precludes the prospect of direct class conflict in the sense
usually outlined in models of the former variety. Where an increase in mark-up mechanically
reduces the real wage in standard Kaleckian models, in a disarticulated model an increase in the
tradable sector mark-up has no direct effect on the real wage in either sector. Distributional conflict
would reappear in the model if workers consumed tradable goods.
In summary, as follows intuitively, a redistribution towards workers (underlined by an
increase in the main distributional variable of interest in this model, v) brings about an increase in
consumption expenditure on non-tradable goods, as these are the goods workers purchase
exclusively. It is expected that an increase in v would particularly increase non-tradable output
when the mark-up is constant, because of how . is determined. For simplicity, we assume no
capital is used in this sector, as such output is increased in this sector through greater use of labour.
Even though capital is excluded from this sector, we broadly have the conditions for ‘wage-led’
output growth in this sector after a redistribution since nothing in this model suggests the
possibility of increased consumption demand being mitigated by lowered rates of accumulation
(since there is no accumulation of capital in this sector) nor worsened export performance (since
this is the non-tradable sector, where production is exclusively for domestic consumption).
13

However, in contrast to the non-tradable sector, the tradable sector exhibits a tendency toward
‘profit-led growth’, with the increase in v negatively affecting the profit share (in Case 1) and
negatively affecting the rate of utilization (in Case 2). Output remains unchanged in this sector
when v increases (unless the mark-up is constant, in which case output declines, since . increases).
The core finding from this model, which ties into the literature review, is that the rate of
accumulation declines in both cases.
How does this differ from the results that follow from standard neo-Kaleckian models?
Since we have a sectoral disaggregation where one sector can exhibit wage-led and the other profitled tendencies the aggregate character of the economy is left ambiguous. Stimulating the wage
share with minimum wages or other policies that strengthen the bargaining power of workers can
have adverse implications for structural change by harming advanced sector activity considering
the absence of an accelerator effect to greater wage-demand.
3.2 Long run issues
Interest in questions of macroeconomic development necessitates a view on the long run. The
principal aim of this paper is to illustrate the lack of robustness of even short-run Kaleckian
conclusions to ‘disarticulated’ contexts. However, the model outlined above can be used to derive
positive conclusions about development too. In the long run we assume capital is utilized at the
level chosen by firms and net exports are zero. Further, the price of tradable goods is internationally
given, so any increase in v necessarily lowers the tradable sector profit-share (there is no scope for
the mark-up to remain constant). Under these conditions the prospects for ‘wage-led growth’ are
further diminished. Positive effects of redistribution on utilization fail to arise now not only
because of ‘social disarticulation’, but also because utilization rests at a ‘desired rate’ and there is
limited space for capitalists in the tradable sector to maintain their profit-share in the aftermath of
increased worker bargaining power. However, industrial policy and interest rate policy
interventions can still be implemented to mediate conflict between capital and labour to ensure the
interests of this sector are promoted. Unlike in the simple Kaleckian context, in the disarticulated
context it is possible to stimulate the profit-share without reducing the real wage.
4. Conclusion
The main policy conclusion that can be derived from this paper is negative insofar as this paper
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outlines constraints on the applicability of ‘wage-led’ strategies in developing countries, where the
economic structure fits a ‘disarticulated’ pattern. To put the central analysis derived above more
clearly, the lack of worker consumption for manufactures negatively impacts on the space for
wage-led industrialization. One way of presenting the negative claim about the applicability of
‘wage-led’ strategies in developing countries in terms of a positive claim is to argue for the
importance of industrial policies.
There are some strong limitations on the analysis derived from this paper insofar as the model
relies on a still imprecise distinction between two sectors. A more comprehensive model would be
required to assess completely the relationship between distribution and growth in a particular
underdeveloped economy. Notably, the model presented in section 3.1 fails to distinguish clearly
between sectors as diverse as, on the one hand, manufacturing and mining (that fall into the
tradable sector) and, on the other hand, services and subsistence agriculture (that fall into the nontradable sector). For the purpose of this paper however, the model serves as a sufficient basis for
raising questions about the applicability of neo-Kaleckian models, particularly in developing
country contexts.
What this paper has principally aimed to establish was three-fold: 1) A review of Kalecki’s
views on development and assessment of the compatibility of these views with the contemporary
Kaleckian literature. 2) Setting forward an alternative framework which captures constraints on
the applicability of the policy insights from neo-Kaleckian models in developing country contexts.
3) Analysis of what policy conclusions follow from the above parts.
With respect to the broader implications of these insights, it should firstly be emphasized
that none of the arguments presented in this paper present an argument in favour of inegalitarian
distribution of income. That said, the debate about macroeconomic policy in developing countries
has to take careful stock of the implications of policy within frameworks including structural
heterogeneity. Alongside careful interrogation of the implications of policy, tactical use of rhetoric
regarding ‘wage-led growth’ may be useful, but it may be problematic if their use precedes this
interrogation. The consequences may be harmful to the prospects of realizing alternatives to the
orthodoxy if they 1) result in inappropriate policies that harm the economy and damage the
credibility of heterodox thought, 2) if they channel the heterodoxy’s focus from the genesis of
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more fruitful lines of enquiry and 3) if the public debate shifts toward instrumentalising social
outcomes of intrinsic value to their growth consequences, as Skott (2016) has emphasized.
In summary of the central conclusion of this paper, to achieve development (structural
transformation), merely leveraging aggregate demand policy (in this case, shifts in income
distribution) is insufficient. This insufficiency is underlined by one sector models in general and
calls for ‘wage-led growth’ in particular.
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Appendix 1

p
q
r
u
v
Äl
/
+
s
.
0

Profit share
Mark-up
Profit rate
Rate of capacity utilisation
Capital-capacity ratio
Saving function
Accumulation rate
Saving (out of profits)
Animal spirits
Impact of utilisation on investment

Y = (/(1 + ()

(18)

In this model, a rise in the mark-up captures a decline in the real wage. Changes in the mark-up
are treated as exogenous in this model.
Å = Y*/%

(19)
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Äl = EÅ = EY*/%
V

(20)

= . + 0*

W

(21)

The model is solved for a goods market equilibrium by equating the saving and investment
functions, such that they intersect, provided the Keynesian stability condition, which specifies that
the slope of the saving function is greater than the slope of the investment function:
EY > %0*

(22)

This implies that the responsiveness of saving to a change in utilisation has to be greater than the
responsiveness of investment to a change in utilisation.
The equilibrium value of the rate of utilisation is found as:
k

*∗ = ÇÉ
Ñ

(23)

f

V

k

(W)∗ = . + ÇÉ
Ñ

Äl∗ =

(lak)/(

(24)

f

ÇÉ
f)
Ñ

(25)

c

Core to this model is the assumption that a homogenous output is produced for both consumption
and investment purposes.
In summary then, the basic model is a useful formulation because it outlines the inverse of the
‘paradox of thrift’, since a lower propensity to save becomes expansionary and induces a growth
of consumption demand, utilisation and as a result investment (Hein, 2014: 254):
b_∗
bl

=

fka/c
(laf)g

n ∗

bPoS
bl

=

<0

fka/c
ÇÉ

( Ñ f)g

(26)

<0

(27)

The model also allows for an illustration of the inverse of the ‘paradox of costs’ by highlighting
the ability of higher real wages to bringing about higher rates of capacity utilization, improved
growth rates and higher profit rates.
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n ∗
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o
ba

=
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Ö
Ñ
(laf)g

fk(l )

(28)

<0

(29)

This model thus establishes the prospects for ‘wage-led growth’ (exclusively, by precluding the
possibility of ‘profit-led growth’) since capital accumulation is primarily a function of the rate of
utilisation. Hence, the neo-Kaleckian model has no space for the potential negative effects of a
reduced profit share of income on investment. As we will see below, the possibility of ‘profit-led
growth’ was highlighted by Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) in the ‘post-Kaleckian model’. Their
extension essentially updates the investment function to include the effect of changes in the profit
share on investment. There is now the possibility of an invalidation of the underconsumptionist
investment function expressed in the neo-Kaleckian model (Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990: 379).
V
W

= . + 0* + 1Y

(30)

Solving the model for the equilibrium rate of utilisation (using the saving function of the neoKaleckian model) we get the following:
k}pa

*∗ =

(31)

ÇÉ
f
Ñ

V

k}pa

(W)∗ = . + 0( ÇÉ

f

Ñ

) + 1Y

(32)

If we derive this with respect to the savings rate, we see that the paradox of thrift still holds:
b_∗
bl
n
o

=

b( )∗
bl

f(k}pa)a/c

=

ÇÉ

( Ñ f)g
É
Ñ

f(k}pa)
ÇÉ
Ñ

( f)g

<0

(33)

<0

(34)

However, the paradox of cost no longer necessarily holds, since the derivative of the equilibrium
utilisation rate with respect to changes of the profit share is no longer necessarily negative, as in
the neo-Kaleckian model (equations 11 and 12):
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This shows the possibility of two regimes: a ‘stagnationist regime’ (wage-led regime), where
investment is weakly responsive to changes in the profit share, and an ‘exhilarationist regime’
(profit-led regime), where the capitalist class responds more strongly to changes in the profit share
(Bhaduri and Marglin, 1990: 381-382).
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!" = :#"

(37)

Since the non-tradable sector is not particularly capital intensive, for simplicity capital is assumed
not to be a factor of production in this sector. There are constant returns to labour.
We assume utilisation at an actual rate below full capacity in the short-run, which enters the
production function as follows.
!' = á# ' = *H+

(38)

!" = -"

(39)

The equilibrium condition for the non-tradable sector is given by the above equation (nontradable output equals demand for non-tradable goods).
Using the equilibrium condition for the non-tradable sector:
!" = -"

(40)

Equation 7 gives the real exchange rate, defined as the relative price of tradable goods to nontradable goods, in terms of domestic currency.

5

Variables used in appendices 2-5 are defined in a table in section 3.1.
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,=

Q9R

(41)
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Exports are predetermined in the short-run, but by assumption, all tradable sector produce that is
not consumed domestically is exported in the long-run:
M = !' − -'

(42)

Aggregate output in the model, in terms of non-tradable goods, can be found through the following
equation:
! = !" + ,!'

(43)

Finally, aggregate domestic demand (also in terms of non-tradable goods) is given by:
9

- = -" + ,-' + , 9o /

(44)

R

Using the equilibrium condition for the non-tradable sector:
!" = -"

(45)

And solving for !" gives the following equilibrium value of non-tradable output (a proof can be
found in Appendix 3) and employment:
Appendix 3
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Appendix 5
For the purposes of deriving further policy conclusions, a simple extension to the model,
incorporating a tradable sector union wage premium, can be included here:
-" = %:#" + 4%:# ' + (1 − E)(.)[,*H+ − 4%:# ' + :#" − )#" ]

(46)

The wage in the tradable sector is no longer equal to the wage in the non-tradable sector, which
has implications for the demand for non-tradable goods equation.
-' = (1 − E)(1 − .)[,*H+ − 4%:# ' + :#" − %:#" ]/,

(47)

Likewise, the union wage premium enters the equation for demand for tradable goods.
[

Y ' = 1 − 4%: \]R

(48)

R

The profit share in the tradable sector also undergoes a minor alteration, which has implications
for the accumulation rate equation defined below.
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(49)

The equation depicting mark-up pricing also undergoes a minor alteration.
K&' = (1 + ()4%:&"

(50)

23

